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Croatian counties were tailored with little consideration 
for historical, natural, economic, social, and professional 
criteria. They are rather small in size and population and 
there are considerable differences between them. Subna-
tional electoral system with proportional representation, 
blocked lists and five per cent threshold causes deperso-
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nalisation of local politics. In addition, only few political 
parties and their political agendas could be identified as 
regional. Political arena in the counties is still dominated 
by national parties and their organizational branches whi-
le county elections are highly “nationalized” and subor-
dinated to national elections. The analysis of congruence 
between county and national governments, turnout rates 
and electoral supply shows “second-orderness” of county 
elections resulting in voters’ orientation towards national 
elections and statewide parties. Counties are politically au-
tonomous, but fiscally depend on the central state, which 
in turn has a decisive influence on county voters’ political 
behaviour at the county level – they turn to statewide par-
ties just as counties turn to the state. The abolishment of 
counties and introduction of true regions with broader au-
tonomous scope of affairs in the Croatian territorial orga-
nization could contribute to a positive feedback of regional 
electorate towards genuine regional politics.
Key words: counties, Croatia, electoral system, national 
elections, county elections, county assembly, regional poli-
tical parties, regional politics
1. Introduction
The territorial self-government in the Republic of Croatia is two-tiered, 
with municipalities (općina) and towns (grad) at the municipal level and 
counties (županija) at the second level.1 Between 1992 and 2001, coun-
ties were supposed to serve as the middle tier of government and were 
1  The first draft of this paper was presented at XXII IPSA World Congress of Politi-
cal Science Reshaping Power, Shifting Boundaries in Madrid, July 8–12, 2012, within panel 
Regionalization of Regional Elections: Beyond Mid-Term and Second-Order Elections. The sec-
ond draft of the paper was presented at Council for European Studies, Columbia Universi-
ty’s 20th International Conference of Europeanists Crisis and Contingency: States of Instability, 
University of Amsterdam 2013, 25–27 June within Panel 087. Territoriality in the National 
and Regional Vote in Central and Eastern Europe. Both panels were chaired and discussed 
by Arjan H. Schakel, Assistant Professor in Research Methods at Maastricht University 
and Régis Dandoy, Research Associate at the University of Brussels and the University of 
Louvain, who conceptualized and coordinated a research project on regional elections in 
Central and Eastern European countries. This paper is only partially following the research 
framework proposed by Schakel.
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intended to have a limited autonomous scope, but their first and more im-
portant role was to be the units of deconcentrated state administration. In 
2001, counties became solely units of regional self-government: they lost 
all the competences with regard to deconcentrated state administration 
and obtained a wider autonomous scope. However, a rather weak self-gov-
ernment capacity of the counties limits the possibility for strengthening 
the genuine regional political processes. Subnational politics still lacks the 
influence of regional parties that would have regional problem-oriented 
approach and political programs for economic and social development of 
the region. Therefore, county elections are identified as second-order in 
comparison to national elections. 
The paper’s theoretical framework is second-order election effects theory 
in the Croatian county elections, which assumes that county elections are 
subordinate to national elections. In its first chapter, the paper gives an 
overview of the territorial self-government in Croatia, i.e. developments 
and current trends in the territorial structure, the scope of local affairs, 
and the political system. In subsequent chapter factors of regional distinc-
tiveness – institutional (electoral system and electoral calendar), ideolog-
ical, geographical, economic and political – are analysed. The third chap-
ter analyses second-order election effects and thus the status of county 
elections in respect to national elections by measuring the congruence 
between national and county government, analysing turnout rates and 
electoral supply (political parties’ participation at the county level, elec-
toral coalitions and party volatility).
2.  Constitutional and Legal Settings of the 
Croatian Territorial Self-Government System 
2.1. Territorial Structure and Scope of Local Affairs
Before gaining independence at the beginning of 1991, Croatia was one 
of six republics in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
During that period, the official ideology was very much inclined to Marx-
ist form of strong local communes, so that self-management in munici-
palities became a widespread practice – the whole system was strongly 
local-oriented.2 Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia had a very 
2  More on the history of the Croatian local self-government in Koprić, 2003: 183–187.
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strong municipal level of government consisting of 101 large communes 
and a relatively weak state level,3 in terms of competences, finances, civil 
servants, etc. The first multiparty elections were held in May 1990, at both 
local (municipalities) and central levels within the frame of old, socialist 
institutions (three-chamber representative bodies). The new Constitution 
adopted at the end of 1990 granted the right to local self-government. 
The Homeland War, which lasted between 1991 and 1995, slowed down 
the process of transition to market economy and full multi-party system, 
financially exhausting the country and detrimentally affecting new de-
mocracy.
At the very end of 1992, after a two-year delay, Croatia started to de-
velop a new local governance system. The first local elections under new 
circumstances were held on 7th February 1993. The radical territorial re-
form of 1992/93 introduced the so-called system of local self-government 
and administration, with two tiers of self-government units, municipalities 
(općina) and towns (grad) at the local level,4 and counties (županija) at 
the regional level. The City of Zagreb as the capital and the largest unit 
enjoyed a special legal position having competences of both a city and a 
county.5 In comparison to the socialist period, municipalities lost many 
of their competences, revenues, and a significant part of local govern-
ments’ property. Strict central control over local self-government units 
was implemented. Besides strong centralization, the system was highly 
politicized. The counties played a particularly important role in strong 
central supervision and had a rather narrow autonomy. They were central-
ization instruments in the hands of central government and president of 
the Republic. The institution of county governor was especially criticized 
in that regard. He/she was elected by the county assembly, but had to be 
confirmed by the President, on the Government’s proposal. While being 
highly influenced by the ministries in performing a broad range of state 
administrative affairs, counties’ self-government scope of affairs was lim-
ited to co-ordination and supervision over the activities of municipalities 
and towns (more in: Koprić, 2003: 187–200). 
3   There was no mid-tier level in Croatia at that time. Previous form of intermunici-
pal arrangement named communities of municipalities (zajednice općina) was dissolved by the 
Amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia of 25th July 1990 (Art. 3).
4  A new category of large towns was introduced in 2005. They have somewhat broad-
er scope of affairs than towns and may perform the county affairs on their territory.
5  It also performs numerous state administration tasks on its territory and is the larg-
est and the most prosperous city.
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It was only after the 2000 parliamentary and presidential election and 
subsequent formation of a left-wing coalition government that the process 
of decentralization began in 2001. A major change in the local self-gov-
ernment scope of competences was a result of decentralisation process 
that started with the Amendments to the Constitution at the end of 2000. 
The number of counties and their territorial organization remained most-
ly the same since their establishment in 1993, but the very concept and 
role of counties was redefined in the 2001 reforms. The concept of local 
self-government, together with the principle of subsidiarity and solidarity, 
was accepted in that reform (Koprić, 2003: 200–204; Koprić, 2009; Ko-
prić, 2010: 111–112). The new Law on Local and Regional Self-Govern-
ment, adopted in 2001, introduced the general clause according to which 
the self-government scope of affairs of municipalities, towns, and counties 
includes all public affairs that are not explicitly excluded by law.6 Until 
2001, counties were intended to be both units of state administration and 
autonomous units, but in reality, they merely served as units of decon-
centrated state administration. The status of the counties was changed 
in 2001 when they became units of ‘territorial (regional) self-government’ 
and, at the same time, lost almost all their competences with regard to de-
concentrated state administration. According to the 2001 Law, counties 
perform affairs of regional significance, in particular related to education, 
health services, spatial and urban planning, economic development, traf-
fic and traffic infrastructure, planning and development of networks of 
educational, social, cultural and health institutions, issuing location and 
construction licenses and other urban planning documents outside large 
towns, and maintenance of public roads outside large towns. 
When looking at the data on unemployment rates and income, some 
counties are quite homogenous; others face substantial internal dispari-
ties. There are significant differences among the counties and although 
county revenues7 play a role in reducing regional income inequalities in 
Croatia, they are unable to prevent inequalities despite various meas-
6  In contrast, the previous Law of 1992 had prescribed enumeration for municipal-
ities and counties, in which case only those public affairs that were allocated specifically to 
local self-government units were considered as local affairs. However, the method of general 
clause was applied to towns even at that time.
7  The Law on Financing Local and Regional Self-Government Units stipulates four 
county taxes: inheritance and gifts tax, motor vehicles tax, boats tax and slot machines tax. 
However, counties may decide to transfer the income from these taxes to towns and mu-
nicipalities within their boundaries. Other sources of county income come from its assets, 
central state grants, misdemeanour fines, etc. but they are rather insignificant.
480
Koprić, I., D. Dubajić, T. Vukojičić Tomić (2015) County Elections in Croatia ...







ures for disadvantaged units. The City of Zagreb and three counties (Is-
tarska, Primorsko-Goranska, Zagrebačka) have above-average income 
and low unemployment rates, whereas the majority of underdeveloped 
counties are situated mostly in Eastern Croatia (Brodsko-Posavska, Vu-
kovarsko-Srijemska, Virovitičko-Podravska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, Os-
ječko- -Baranj ska) (Puljiz, Maleković, 2007: 10, 17). In those counties, 
as well as in Ličko-Senjska County, depopulation processes are also no-
ticeable. 
In 2005, Croatia registered four statistical units – Central Croatia (com-
prising five counties), Zagreb Region (City of Zagreb and Zagrebačka 
County), Adriatic Croatia (seven counties) and Eastern Croatia (seven 
counties) (Koprić, 2010: 674–675). Later, in 2007, three NUTS II units 
or statistical regions (North-West Croatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, 
and Adriatic Croatia) were introduced, according to the NUTS classifica-
tion.8 This was a result of political processes at the time and it was neither 
responsive to the development needs nor to the optimal utilisation of EU 
funds (Đulabić, 2013: 189). For that reason, in 2012 Croatia introduced 
two NUTS II regions: Adriatic Croatia that comprises seven coastal coun-
ties and Continental Croatia that comprises thirteen counties and the 
City of Zagreb. According to Đulabić (2013: 192), new statistical classi-
fication enables utilization of EU funds under the most favourable condi-
tions, with the highest rate of project co-financing from the EU. Counties 
are classified as NUTS III units and represent a basis for the formation of 
broader statistical regions. This fact hinders the functioning of counties as 
proper regional development actors with sufficient financial, professional, 
and other capacities. It can be concluded that the Croatian counties are 
not large enough to be considered as real regions in European context 
(Blažević, 2010: 189). Moreover, a historically and geographically rooted 
sense of regional identities exists, but counties are much smaller than 
such entities. 
Croatian counties had quite a vivid history of serving daily political needs 
and interests of the central government rather than interest of their citi-
zens. Aggregation and articulation of regional specific interests was one 
8  NUTS refers to the classification of the territorial units for statistical purposes in-
troduced by EUROSTAT. NUTS classification consists of three categories of regional units 
differing in terms of number of inhabitants. NUTS I units represent areas that encompass 
between min. 3 and max. 7 million inhabitants, NUTS II between min. 800 thousand and 
max. 3 million inhabitants and NUTS III between min. 150 thousand and max. 800 thou-
sand inhabitants.
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of the proclaimed reasons for establishing a bicameral parliamentary sys-
tem that existed in Croatia in the period 1990–2001. At the time, the 
Croatian Parliament consisted of the House of Representatives and the 
House of Counties. The latter served as a deliberative and consultative 
chamber. Members of the House of Counties were elected in special elec-
tions held in 1993 and 1997, in 21 three-mandate electoral districts by 
the principle of proportional representation.9 The very nature and role of 
the second chamber were contested (see infra 3.4.). Only a smaller num-
ber of counties coincided with the areas of specific historical and cultural 
identity (Istarska, Međimurska, Zadarska, Krapinsko-zagorska). Histori-
cal regions (Dalmatia, Slavonia, north-western Croatia) are divided into 
several counties. Considering the nature of such a representative base, 
second chamber was not a representative body of regional, but of “admin-
istrative-bureaucratic interests articulating in particular territorial units” 
and “colonisation of political parties” (Kasapović, 1997: 97).10 
The role of the counties has shifted from executing state administrative 
tasks towards the autonomous, enabling, and supportive tasks, i.e. coor-
dination and support of weak municipalities, administration of “decen-
tralized” social services (education, health, social care), and a slight push 
towards economic development. Considerable regional differences still 
to a large extent affect the limited economic and fiscal capacities of the 
majority of counties, making them incapable of initiating and supporting 
regional development (Koprić, 2013: 12). The counties were tailored with 
little consideration for historical, natural, economic, social and profession-
al criteria for establishment of natural self-governing entities (Ivanišević 
2003: 28; Koprić, 2010: 115–116). Furthermore, frequent change of sub-
national electoral system has caused a dynamic history of local and re-
gional political processes in Croatia.
2.2. Local and County Political System
Local and regional units have the same governance structure based on the 
principle of separation of powers. Representative bodies are the munici-
9  Both times the HDZ won the majority of seats (58.7 per cent in 1993; 65.1 per cent 
in 1997) whereas the strongest regionalist party, IDS in Istarska County won only 4.8 per 
cent resp. 3.2 per cent of the seat share (Kasapović, 1997: 102).
10  Candidates could be residents of a county different from the county in which they 
were competing.
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pal or town council (vijeće) and county assembly (županijska skupština). 
Since the 2009 subnational elections, executive bodies are the municipal 
or town mayor (općinski načelnik, gradonačelnik) and the county governor 
(župan). The number of seats in the local and regional representative bo-
dies depends on the number of inhabitants in the local unit.11 The size of 
the local council ranges from 7 to 15 members in municipalities and from 
13 to 35 members in towns, while county assemblies have 31 to 51 mem-
bers.12 Among other things, these ranges have shown that citizen’s vote 
is worth less in urban than in rural communities (Koprić, 2009: 9). Local 
and county councillors have four-year non-imperative mandates. After 
the 1990 elections, general local elections were held six times (in 1993, 
1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013). The electoral system was changed 
four times. Only last four general local elections were held according 
to the same rules – full application of the proportional representation 
principle.
The system of absolute majority was used only in the 1990 elections. 
Local elections of 1993 were held with the usage of fragmented or mixed 
proportional and majority electoral system.13 One half of the councillors 
was elected by proportional representation from either political parties or 
independent lists,14 while the other half was elected in election districts 
by one-round relative majority system.15 They were held simultaneously 
with the elections for the House of Counties. Fragmented system was 
applied in the 1992 and 1995 national elections. Fragmented system 
was applied also in the 1997 general local elections (3/4 share of pro-
11  In the elections for county assembly, members of national minorities that partici-
pate with more than 5% in total county population have the right to proportional representa-
tion in the county assembly. If the proportion is not accomplished in regular local elections, 
additional elections will be held and under certain conditions, the number of county assem-
bly representatives may be even.
12  Since 2001, the City of Zagreb Assembly has had 51 members.
13  The fragmented electoral system is widely used in the East European post-com-
munist states as a result of political compromise between the ruling party and opposition. 
Kasapović uses the term segmented or ‘entrenched’ electoral systems (die Grabensysteme) 
because of the differences between the proportional and majority systems (Kasapović, 1995: 
173). 
14  The threshold was 5 per cent of votes. More about independents in: Koprić, 2007; 
Koprić, 2011.
15  In the majority system, the local unit is divided into as many electoral districts 
as there are members to be elected – one member is elected in each electoral district. In 
the proportional system, the entire territory of the county or the municipality becomes an 
electoral unit.
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portional representation). The use of this rather hybrid system assumes 
that no “interdependence between the proportional and the majority 
part” exists, because members of representative bodies are elected thro-
ugh two separate electoral systems (Kasapović, 1995: 173–175; Omejec, 
2003: 270).
The full implementation of proportional representation with blocked lists 
was introduced in the 2001 general local elections; the following elections 
of 2005, 2009, and 2013 were held applying the same electoral procedure. 
This system provides for competition of party and independent lists, wit-
hout competition of individual candidates. Only the lists that gain more 
than 5 per cent of votes can divide the seats in representative bodies (5 per 
cent threshold). The number of seats for each list is calculated by using 
D’Hondt’s method. Although the proportional system is theoretically in 
favour of small parties and independents, the relatively high threshold 
and small number of voters in the majority of Croatian municipalities has 
produced somewhat different results.16 However, proportionality system 
allows certain number of small actors into local representative bodies, 
which can cause frequent political conflicts and inefficiency of local deci-
sion-making. Moreover, blocked lists cause depersonalisation of local po-
litics – this is inadequate for local communities in which voters may iden-
tify themselves with certain candidates and their political programmes. In 
addition, local elections often serve as a ‘laboratory’ to experiment with 
new institutional and political solutions before they are applied in natio-
nal elections (Kasapović, 2004: 65). However, the situation in Croatia is 
quite the opposite – proportional electoral system was first applied in the 
2000 national elections and only after that in the 2001 local elections. 
Due to fact that voters usually express their attitude toward political par-
ties at the national level when voting in their municipalities and counties, 
local politics is under strong influence of political parties and their natio-
nal political programmes. 
Interrelations between local bodies have fairly changed after the intro-
duction of the direct election of mayors and county governors in 2009.17 
16  Independents won more than 20 per cent of votes and got about 10 per cent of 
seats in the 2009 local elections (more in: Koprić, 2011: 92).
17  Prior to introduction of directly elected mayors and county governors, each local 
self-government unit had two executive bodies: an individual executive functionary and a 
collegial executive body. From 1993 to 2005, mayors and county governors were appointed 
by the local representative bodies. The same procedure was applied regarding members of 
the executive body but they were proposed by the previously appointed executive function-
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Previous parliamentary-like relationship between representative and 
executive bodies is now more presidential-like, although representative 
bodies are entitled to some control mechanisms over executive functi-
onaries. Strong position and political influence of the local executive 
functionary has been extended further. The mayor has taken over all 
the competences previously belonging to the collective executive bodi-
es. The mayor can exert significantly influence the council’s decisions. 
Initial expectations from the introduction of directly elected of mayors, 
such as “higher rate of voters’ turnout” and “decrease of party politi-
cisation, reinforcement of ethical standards, and more managerial-like 
behaviour of mayors” have not been realized (Koprić, Vukojičić Tomić, 
2013: 164-183). Since 1st January  2013, local executives’ power has 
been somewhat weakened by a new institute of simultaneous dissolution 
of the council and dismissal of the mayor by the Government in cases 
of delay in budget voting, since this crises have often occurred in local 
units where executive functionaries come from different political party 
than the majority of the councillors.18
3. Contextual Factors of Regional Distinctiveness 
In order to explore second-order election effects in county elections in 
the fourth chapter, a selected set of factors that might contribute to un-
derstanding the distinctiveness across counties ought to be analysed first. 
The difference in voters’ behaviour and strategies of the political parties 
participating in county elections over time may be understood by institu-
tional, ideological, geographical, economic, and political factors.
ary. Beside authority to assemble and govern the executive body, the executive functionary 
also had other competences with regard to local representative bodies and in relations be-
tween municipalities and central state bodies, which confirmed their power even when they 
were elected in such an indirect way. It is therefore possible to say that such a system had 
strong elements of monocracy and (quasi) hierarchy (more on the characteristics of different 
types of local executive bodies see in Ivanišević, 2008). 
18   The main arguments for the introduction of the new institute of simultaneous 
dissolution of the local representative and executive bodies are slow and ineffective deci-
sion-making processes, mutual obstructions and blockades, and dissolution of local repre-
sentative bodies. 
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3.1. Institutional Framework 
3.1.1. Electoral System
County elections are elections for the county assembly and, since 2009, 
for the county governor (county executive body) and his two deputies. 
The elections are direct, free and candidates are elected by secret ballot. 
The most important aspects of the overall Croatian electoral system can 
be seen in the Table 1. 










Absolute majority in the 1st 




Fragmented system with 50:50 
% ratio of the majority* and  
proportional systems; 64 
uninominal electoral districts 
applying the principle of  
one-round relative majority1 
and 60 proportional lists for the 
national level (3%  





with 50:50% ratio  
of (one-round) relative 
majority and  
proportional system  
(5% threshold for  
the lists).
Fragmented system 
with 50:50% ratio  
of (one-round) relative 
majority and  
proportional system  
(5% threshold for  
the lists).
*  Four uninominal electoral districts were only for representatives of ethnic and nati-
onal communities or minorities whose share in population was lower than 8 per cent, i.e. for 
representatives of the Hungarian, Italian, Czech, Slovakian, Russian, Ukrainian, German, 
and Austrian national minorities. In the Parliament, 14 MPs were elected subsequently, 13 
thereof as representatives of national and/or ethnic minorities whose share in population 
is larger than 8 per cent (Serbian national minority) and one MP as the representative of 
those minorities whose share is lower than 8 per cent (State Electoral Commission, www.
izbori.hr).
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Fragmented system with 25:75 
% ratio of the majority and  
proportional systems; 32 
uninominal electoral districts 
applying principle of one-round 
relative majority** and 80  
proportional lists for national 
level (5% threshold for one 
party or independent list, 8% 
threshold for two-party list,  
11% threshold for electoral  





with 25:75% ratio of 
(one-round) relative 
majority and  
proportional system 
(5% threshold for 
the lists).
Fragmented system 
with 25:75% ratio  
of (one-round) relative 
majority and  
proportional system 
(5% threshold for  
the lists).
2000
Proportional system; 10 
plurinominal electoral units 
+ 1 special electoral unit for 
non-resident Croatian citizens 
(diaspora) + 1 special electoral 
unit for national minorities; 
single vote, closed blocked 
lists, 5% threshold, D’Hondt’s 





closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of 
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
Proportional system; 
closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of  
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt 
method of mandate 
calculation.
**   Four uninominal electoral districts were created for voters of the Hungarian, 
Italian, Czech, Slovakian, Russian, Ukrainian, German, and Austrian national minorities. 
Majority segment included one special three-mandate electoral district for the representa-
tives of Serbian national minority, while proportional segment included one special twelve-
mandate electoral district for voters who are non-resident Croatian citizens (State Electoral 
Commission, www.izbori.hr).
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Proportional system; 10 
plurinominal electoral units 
+ 1 special electoral unit for 
non-resident Croatian citizens 
(diaspora) + 1 special electoral 
unit for national minorities; 
single vote, closed blocked lists, 
5% threshold, D’Hondt’s  





closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of 
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
Proportional system; 
closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of  
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
2007
Proportional system; 10 
plurinominal electoral units 
+ 1 special electoral unit for 
non-resident Croatian citizens 
(diaspora) + 1 special electoral 
unit for national minorities; 
single vote, closed blocked 
lists, 5% threshold, D’Hondt’s 





closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of 
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
County governor  
elections: county  
governor is elected  
in two rounds.
Proportional system; 
closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of  
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
Town mayor/ 
municipality mayor is 
elected in two rounds.
2011
Proportional system; 10 
plurinominal electoral units 
+ 1 special electoral unit for 
non-resident Croatian citizens 
(diaspora) + 1 special electoral 
unit for national minorities; 
single vote, closed blocked lists, 
5% threshold, D’Hondt’s  
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closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of 
constituency deter-
mined by the counties’ 
statutes, 5% threshold, 
D’Hondt’s method of 
mandate calculation.
County governor  
elections: county  
governor is elected  
in two rounds.
Proportional system; 
closed blocked lists, 
single vote, size of 
constituency  
determined by the 
counties’ statutes, 5% 
threshold, D’Hondt’s 
method of mandate 
calculation.
Town mayor/ 
municipality mayor is 
elected in two rounds.
Source: Kasapović, 2004: 84, adapted by the authors
Subnational (local and regional) electoral model is fully harmonized with 
national one, with only difference regarding the size of the constituency. 
At the national level, the model is determined by the Law on Electoral 
Units for Elections of Representatives in the Croatian Parliament, while 
at both local and county levels it is determined by the statutes of local 
units.
Regarding the size of the constituencies, until 2000 and introduction 
of the exclusively proportional system, each electoral cycle had a diffe-
rent number of electoral units for both national and local elections. The 
changing boundaries of the electoral units caused constant volatility of 
voters’ number therein. This type of gerrymandering strategy was used 
by the leading party (HDZ) and operationalized by two main steps: the 
first one was decreasing the size of “electoral strongholds” (see below) 
and shifting the redundant votes (those exceeding 50 per cent+1 of total 
votes) for HDZ to electoral units in those areas where votes were needed 
more; the second one was creating several large electoral units in the 
areas where HDZ had less chance for success and where voters and votes 
cast for rival parties would have been as clustered as possible (Kasapović, 
1995a: 20).
3.1.2. Electoral Calendar
Electoral calendar is determined by the Law on Local Elections. Elections 
for the county assemblies and the City of Zagreb Assembly (since 2009, 
also for the county governors and the mayor of the City of Zagreb) are 
called by the Government every four years and held at the same time in 
each county (horizontal simultaneity). County elections are held simulta-
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neously with elections for the mayors and municipal and town councils, 
and take place in the middle of the national election cycle. 
Table 2: County elections as mid-term elections
County elections Days after previous national elections
February 7th 1993 189
April 13th 1997 532
May 20th 2001 503
May 15th 2005 539
May 17th 2009 539
May 19th 2013 532
Source: Authors
Since 2001, elections for the municipal and town councils, county assem-
blies and the City of Zagreb Assembly have been held on the third Sun-
day in May. Both county councillors and county governors have four-year 
mandates. A member of the local representative body may not perform 
the same function in another local unit, civil service in his local unit, or 
a state function. If a member of the local representative body accepts a 
duty considered incompatible with his/her mandate, the latter will stand 
still during the performance of incompatible duty, with a deputy substi-
tuting him/her in the local representative body. Furthermore, an MP may 
not perform the function of the county governor or mayor of the City of 
Zagreb. However, the two laws say nothing about the possibility of cumu-
lating the functions of the MP and local councillor or about those of the 
MP and town/municipal mayor. Hence, the two possibilities for cumul des 
mandats are open and in many cases practiced, as approximately 16 per 
cent of the national parliament representatives simultaneously perform 
the function of the town or municipal mayor.19
19  MPs from the governing coalition have better chance to lobby for local projects 
in those local units where they perform the function of the town or municipal mayor. There 
are several initiatives of civil society organizations proposing to ban the accumulation of MP 
and mayoral functions by the law.
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After the fall of self-management socialism in SFR Yugoslavia in 1991, 
Croatian society has been influenced by ideological conflicts more than 
any other CEE country in transition. The polarisation of the electorate in 
those countries may be better explained by socioeconomic conflicts. Em-
pirical researches on voters’ political attitudes and behaviour have shown 
that Croatian political arena can be divided into left wing, right wing, 
and centre, with regionalist parties mostly floating between left wing and 
centre. Furthermore, Croatian electorate may be divided into modernis-
tic-liberal pole (voters of the SDP, IDS, HNS, and HSLS) and conserva-
tive-catholic-nationalistic pole (voters of the HDZ and HSP). HSS voters 
are somewhere in the middle of this continuum, representing traditional 
values, although with moderate nationalistic sentiments. Regionalist par-
ties are not deeply rooted in the ideological basis as their political plat-
form concerns representation of regional interests.20
The configuration of political parties and the political polarization of voters 
in Croatia can be further explained by certain structural cleavages.21 The 
oldest and most important one is the territorial-cultural cleavage, which 
is a difference between the centre and the periphery. This one is partly 
overlapping with ideological-cultural cleavage, which comprises various 
elements of the “religiousness-secularization” conflict (Zakošek, 1998: 
47–48). In conjunction with segmented electoral system, these cleavag-
es shaped the Croatian partisan and political system during the 1990s.22 
The territorial-cultural cleavage (centre-periphery) comprises voters’ atti-
tudes towards Croatian sovereignty and joining EU integrations, national 
and ethnic minorities in Croatia, and the relationships between central 
state and local autonomy. After gaining independence in 1991, territori-
20  Since the 1990s, ethnicity, religion and to some extent urban/rural provenance as 
well as the level of education have been the most important factors influencing party polari-
zation (Zakošek, 1998: 32; differently on the effect of religiousness on party polarization see 
in Kasapović, 1994: 178–179). 
21  In the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan identified cleavage structures arising from three 
historical processes: formation of the national state (centre-periphery), secularization, and 
development of industry and market economy, which is a suitable framework for the re-
search of post-socialist systems (Zakošek, 1998: 16–19).
22   Regional distinct voting patterns could be explained using territorial cleavage 
approach that “starts from a sociological standpoint and predicts that areas with distinct 
territorial identities – history, ethnicity, religion, language, economy will display dissimilar 
election results” (Caramani, 2004 & Rokkan, Urwin, 1983, in Schakel, 2011: 5).
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al oppositions are found in the peripheral, ethnic, regional, and cultural 
communities (Kasapović, 1994: 177). The centre-periphery cleavages are 
found not only among the Serbian ethnic communities aggregated in the 
SDSS but also in regionalist parties who advocate decentralization of the 
country (IDS, PGS, ARS, HDSSB, ZDS). The most expressive territorial 
opposition to the centre has been established in the multicultural Istarska 
County, but the processes of regional identification are also noticeable in 
other parts of the country as a result of centralized governance system and 
of cultural and social discrepancies (ibid.). Furthermore, territorial-cultur-
al cleavage is observable in the attitude of voters of statewide parties re-
garding territorial organization and level of centralization of the country. 
The results of a survey conducted by Zakošek before subnational elections 
in 1997 showed that more than one third of right-wing parties’ voters 
(HDZ and HSP) were in favour of a strong centre, whereas voters of the 
left-wing SDP and centre-oriented HSLS were predominantly in favour of 
a balanced relationship between the centre and the regions (above 80 per 
cent), and below average for centralism (5.2 per cent resp. 7.6 per cent). 
Closer to the latter attitude were the voters of the HSS and other smaller 
centre and left-wing parties (Zakošek, 1998: 40).
The Croatian political system has been bipolarized since 1990 and the 
formation of the first nationalist-unionist polarization axis. After the first 
elections in 1990, the dissolution of the left-wing bloc with the SDP23 as 
its main exponent occurred. Serbian political movement was the first to 
abandon the left bloc (either establishing ethnic parties or falling into 
oblivion), followed by the dissidence of “periphery” opposition move-
ments that formed new regional parties. Meanwhile, a massive Croatian 
national, anti-communist movement amalgamated in a single, right-wing 
conservative party, the HDZ that profiled itself as ideologically and po-
litically the strongest, hegemonic political party with a wide membership. 
Still, the HDZ had not managed to absorb liberal, demochristian, and 
popular political parties. It had not succeeded in swallowing the new-
ly re-established peasant party and some of the right-wing movements 
(Kasapović, 1994: 179–180). On the one hand, there are supporters of the 
Croatian national “centre” with conservative political and social attitudes 
(voters of the HDZ and HSP) and, on the other, supporters of the Croa-
tian “periphery”, advocating decentralization and/or cosmopolitan social 
attitudes (SDP, HNS, HSLS, small centre, left-wing, and regionalist par-
23  In 1990, the SDP still had the extension SKH – Croatian Communist Alliance.
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ties).24 It is obvious that the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural 
cleavages coincide (Zakošek, 1998: 47–48). Classical western-types of 
structural conflict: church vs. state and/or urban vs. rural areas have not 
significantly shaped the Croatian partisan system. The Catholic Church 
in Croatia, which is considered as a traditional bastion of Christianity, has 
mostly had a good relationship with the state, considering it as a “political 
framework of spiritual emancipation” (Kasapović, 1994: 179). Urban-ru-
ral polarization has a strong conflict potential, although is still rather si-
lent and in the shade of the political left-right polarization. This type of 
polarization is to be found more on the regional level, namely peasant 
political parties have mostly regional character as they are competing in 
(mostly rural) North-Western and North-Eastern parts of Croatia (coun-
ties in Zagorje, Međimurje, Podravina and Slavonia).25 Regional parties 
in coastal parts of Croatia are competing in mostly urban or more devel-
oped areas (IDS in Istarska County, PGS in Primorsko-Goranska Coun-
ty, DA in Splitsko-Dalmatinska County). Furthermore, this cleavage has 
further implications on higher vote and seat shares for independent lists 
in the counties along the Adriatic coast, especially in local units in Istar-
ska, Splitsko-Dalmatinska, Šibensko-Kninska, Primorsko-Goranska and 
Dubrovačko-Neretvanska counties, but also in the City of Zagreb and 
Osječko-Baranjska County (Koprić, 2011: 96–97). 
It seems that the majority of political parties in Croatia still reproduce his-
torical territorial and ideological cleavages, which in turn affects political 
behaviour of the new generation of voters (similar: Zakošek, 1998: 48). 
However, around 30 new political parties were established after the the 
2009 elections and many of them competed in the 2011 elections for the 
Croatian parliament reflecting in their political platform socioeconomic 
conflicts that are on the rise throughout Croatia.26 Nevertheless, these 
conflicts, which especially concern the redistribution of resources in the 
conditions of privatization and market liberalization, in the environment 
of the global economic crisis, did not have a decisive effect on reshaping 
24  The HDSSB as a regionalist party advocates decentralization, but its right-wing 
orientation attracts mainly conservative electorate. The case is similar with the ZDS and 
other regionalist parties in northern Croatia.
25  This includes the HSS as the largest peasant party, but partly also regionalist parties 
HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja), PSS (Posavsko-Slavonska 
Party), Zagorje Democratic Party (ZDS), Party of Međimurje (MS), Slavonsko-Baranjska 
Croatian Party (SBHS), etc.
26  Names of these new parties are indicative: Croatian Laburists – Labour Party; 
Action for Better Croatia; Voice of Reason; Alliance for Change, etc.
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the existing partisan system and did not lead to higher mobilization of the 
electorate in the Croatian subnational elections in May 2013. 
3.3. Geographic and Economic Factors
Croatia has five geographic and historical regions: Istria with Primor-
je (including Gorski kotar), Dalmatia, Slavonia, Zagreb, and Central 
(Northwest) Croatia. Instead of taking into account the regions’ geo-
graphic and historical boundaries in designing administrative-territorial 
division of Croatia in 1992/1993, emphasis had been put on the political 
criteria instead of introducing a more functional and development-ori-
ented regionalization. Thus, counties were established as niches for bu-
reaucratization and accumulation of politicized administrative personnel 
(Koprić, 2010: 115; Blažević, 2010: 187). As a direct consequence of this 
process, counties vary in terms of their size, number of inhabitants and 
settlements, number of towns and municipalities within their territory and 
the level of economic development. Although the average county size is 
2.798 km2 and 174.887 inhabitants,27 the numbers hide some important 
disparities. Ličko-Senjska is territorially the largest county (5,353 km2) 
whereas Međimurska is the smallest, 729 km2 (1:7.3 ratio). The county 
with the smallest population is Ličko-Senjska with 51.022 inhabitants, 
whereas Splitsko-Dalmatinska is the most populated with 455.242 inhab-
itants (1:8.9 ratio).28 The highest average GDP per capita in 2008 was re-
corded in the City of Zagreb (€18,554) and Istarska County, and the low-
est (€6.183) in Brodsko-Posavska County (Koprić, 2013: 12). Differences 
in development rate between counties are obvious and growing, which 
has resulted in migration from underdeveloped to more developed ones, 
followed by decrease in the number of professional staff and econom-
ic resources, population aging, depopulation, etc. (cf. Šimunović, 2007: 
172). Furthermore, in comparison to towns and municipalities, counties 
are collecting smallest revenues (only 19.76 per cent of all local revenues, 
27  The National Census of 2011 (State Statistics Office) showed a decrease in the av-
erage number of county inhabitants in all counties compared to the 2001 National Census.
28  Territory of Splitsko-Dalmatinska County comprises 55 local units (16 municipal-
ities and 39 towns) whereas Ličko-Senjska County comprises 12 local units (4 towns and 
8 municipalities). Zagrebačka County has 697 settlements whereas Vukovarsko-Srijemska 
County only 84 (more in: Šimovć et al., 2010: 231, Koprić, 2013: 11).
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Šimović et al., 2010: 245); which is in sharp contrast with their legally 
defined competences (see supra).
3.4. “Regionalization” of County Elections
Regionalization of Croatia was a delicate political and social issue during 
the 1990s as it was considered, in official public discourse, as a separatist 
tendency, if not a subversive threat to national integrity (Blažević, 2010: 
176). Only after 2000 did this topic obtain political attention free of ideo-
logical fallacies. Croatia ratified the European Charter on Local Self-Gov-
ernment in 1997, and the remaining Charter’s principles were ratified in 
2008. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation 
between Territorial Communities or Authorities was ratified in 2003. In 
that way, the country has committed itself to further implementation of 
the subsidiarity principle. All those legal changes intend to strengthen 
local and regional autonomy vis-a-vis central state. Furthermore, Croatia 
has been strongly influenced by Europeanization since the mid-2000s, 
first as an EU candidate country and since 1st July 2013 as a new Mem-
ber State. Adoption and design of legal and institutional framework for 
regional development policy in Croatia is a result of strong EU regional 
policy. This can lead to functional regionalization which conceptualizes 
the regional level of government as an important policy actor in the field 
of general social and economic development. However, the role of coun-
ties in that regard is only minor, and the new regionalisation is under 
examination and design. 
The HDZ as the largest national right-wing party traditionally wins the 
majority of vote and seat shares in underdeveloped and rural areas (this 
includes Ličko-Senjska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, and Krapinsko-Zagorska 
counties), as well as in the areas adversely affected and impoverished by war 
(including Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Osječko-Baranjska, Brodsko-Posavska, 
Šibensko-Kninska and parts of Zadarska and Dubrovačko-Neretvanska 
counties). The SDP as the largest national left-wing party wins majority of 
seats in the Zagreb area, Primorsko-Goranska County, and Međimurska 
County, whose economy is the most developed (Kasapović, 1995a: 20). 
However, certain regional right-wing parties, like the HDSSB in Slavonia, 
have begun to take over voters in their respective areas.  
The widespread viewpoint on political behaviour of the county electorate 
is that it is mostly determined by “partisan identification, as a long-term 
stabilized coherence of an individual towards political parties, rather in-
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dependent of concrete political events and, what is the most important, 
of concrete social context in which this coherence is expressed” (Ome-
jec, 2002: 150). The results of subnational elections, as a political test 
of voters’ support to national government, are thus proving second-order 
election effects.
As seen from above, counties were designed to fulfil volatile political in-
terests rather than to reflect geographic, social, cultural, and other specif-
ics and distinct identities within regional boundaries. Current organisa-
tion of small counties with weak self-government capacities also limits the 
possibility for strengthening the genuine regional political processes and 
overall democratic potential in counties and in wider regions. By further-
ing the decentralization process, Croatia needs to consider the (re-)es-
tablishment of regions, which would have not only a broader policy scope 
and wider financial autonomy, but would also be established according 
to the NUTS II criteria in order to become leading actors in genuine 
regional policy that initiate and support regional development process-
es (Koprić, 2012: 10). Since 2001 and the abolishment of bicameralism 
(see supra 2.1.), there is no institutionalised political representation of the 
regions or different parts of Croatia in the national Parliament, which, 
consequently, strengthens further centralization of the country. By organ-
izing the national elections in five regions, the Parliament could obtain 
(clear) regional representativeness. Regions could then obtain a role in 
the national political system, simultaneously figuring as electoral units for 
national elections, instead of the existing ten electoral units.29 By perform-
ing this additional role, regions would become effective political channels 
for conveying regionally specific interests into the national political arena 
(Kasapović, 2011: 28; Koprić, 2013: 45–46).
29   Ten electoral units for general (national) elections were established in the pe-
riod of bicameral Croatian Parliament, consisting of the House of Representatives and the 
House of Counties, with the latter having the task of representing political interests of dif-
ferent parts of the country. The Constitutional amendments of 2001 abolished the House of 
Counties, which was hugely overrepresented by party members of the then dominant right-
wing national political party – HDZ. Nevertheless, the ten electoral units still exist, although 
gerrymandered, and dividing the country’s territory into illogical parts. The constituency of 
each electoral unit elects 14 MPs, and the number of voters in each unit must not exceed the 
difference of +/-5 per cent. If the regions were to become electoral units, the number of MPs 
elected from each region could be twice as high, the same or lower. Nevertheless, it should 
be related to the size of the region’s constituency and thereby differ not more than +/-5 per 
cent (see also: Koprić, 2013: 46).
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4. County Elections – Framework of Analysis
The dominant theoretical framework used for studying regional elections 
is the second-order election model. It claims that national elections are 
first-order elections, while other elections, such as European and subna-
tional have “less at stake” and are thus subordinate, i.e. of second-order 
nature to national elections (Omejec, 2002: 117 calls them low-stimulus 
elections). According to Reif and Schmitt (1980), in second-order electi-
ons voters’ turnout is lower, and those who do participate cast their vote 
to punish government parties (in: Schakel, 2011: 5). This leads to three 
predictions with regard to regional election results: 
1.  Government parties lose votes.
2.  Turnout in regional elections is lower than in national elections.
3.  Small, new and opposition parties gain votes.
Voters are inclined to behave in these ways following a cyclical logic; they 
are most likely to do so at the mid-point between national elections and 
less likely to do so soon after, or in the run-up to national elections (Reif 
and Schmitt, in: Schakel, Jeffery, 2013: 326). 
In order to examine whether second-order election theory can be confir-
med in county elections in Croatia, Prediction 1 and 2 are examined in 
subchapters Government Congruence Pattern and Turnout Rates, while 
Prediction 3 is examined in subchapter Electoral Supply.
4.1. Government Congruence Pattern
Studies on regional elections in Western European countries show that 
regional elections differ from national elections according to their structu-
ral, procedural, and substantial features, as well as their political and so-
cial importance and effects. Hierarchical subordination of regional electi-
ons to national elections is usually confirmed by their general status, and 
by data on electoral participation and electoral competition in regional 
elections. Voters pay less attention to subnational elections and local poli-
tical institutions because they consider them as irrelevant for the national 
decision-making processes (Kasapović, 2004: 61–62; Schakel, 2011: 2).
County elections in Croatia are highly nationalized, i.e. they reflect na-
tional political institutions, processes and patterns of political behaviour. 
Furthermore, on the hierarchy scale, they might even be considered as 
third-order elections, standing behind national and local elections. The 
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almost absolute domination of one party (HDZ) in both national and 
county elections throughout the 1990s30 and partly in the 2000s can be 
explained by the fact the role of the “constructor of the national state” 
was ascribed to the HDZ, presided by the first Croatian president, Franjo 
Tuđman (Kasapović, 1994: 176–177; Zakošek, 1998: 47). His authoritari-
an leadership in conjunction with successes in liberation of the occupied 
territory led to a strong mobilization of the electorate. In the 1993 county 
elections, the HDZ won absolute or relative majority of the vote share in 
all counties except in Istarska County, where the IDS won almost 90 per 
cent of votes, and in Varaždinska County, where the majority was won 
by the coalition of left-wing parties. In 1997, the HDZ won the national 
elections, and formed regional government in as many as 19 counties.31
Majoritarian effects of the segmented election system can be observed in 
high overrepresentation of HDZ in national and subnational governments 
after two general and two subnational elections in the 1990s. HDZ “re-
mained, figuratively speaking, isolated on the political stage” (Kasapović, 
1995: 185).32 
Another characteristic of county elections showing “nationalizing” effect 
on the local political system is that, especially since 2000 and the intro-
duction of the proportional system, national political parties (sometimes 
together with regional parties) often form different pre-electoral coali-
tions and in that formation usually win the county elections. In 2000, 
centre and left-wing coalition (SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, IDS, and LS) 
won national elections, which initiated an avalanche of party coalitions 
in subsequent subnational elections. Most coalitions at the county level 
are formed by left wing (SDP, HNS) or centrist (HSS) parties, with so-
mewhat smaller parties (HSU), whereas the HDZ usually forms coaliti-
ons with right or far-right (HSP, HKDU, HČSP) or centrist (DC) parties, 
but to a lesser extent. The 2001 local elections were a clear example of 
“barometer” elections – the HDZ as an opposition party in the Croatian 
30   With a steady exception in Istarska and Primorsko-Goranska counties, higher 
average dissimilarity scores are also shown in Ličko-Senjska and Međimurska counties as 
opposition parties received many votes at the county level.
31  The HDZ formed a coalition with right wing parties the HKDU, HSP and KDM 
(later merged with HKDU) in Međimurska County, and with HKDS and HSP in Varaž-
dinska County.
32  In 1992 national elections, the HDZ obtained +16.9 per cent and in 1995 +13.9 
per cent seats. The second strongest party, the HSLS, was underrepresented with -8.3 per 
cent of seats (Kasapović, 1995: 180).
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Parliament managed to win the majority of votes in 14 counties and form 
county governments (alone or in a coalition) in 12 counties. In the 2003 
parliamentary elections, the HDZ won a relative majority and formed a 
smaller coalition with the HSS, HSLS, DC, and SDSS, so the 2005 local 
elections were again a “coalition parade” – only Ličko-Senjska County had 
no coalition government (HDZ obtained 57.77 per cent seat share). The 
HDZ formed government in 10 counties (sometimes again in unusual co-
alitions, such as with the HNS and HSS in Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska County 
and with the HNS in Međimurska County). In eight counties, the SDP 
formed government with the HNS, HSS and smaller parties (with SDA in 
Sisačko-Moslavačka County), while Istra remained electoral stronghold 
of the IDS. The HNS, HSLS and SHUS (the Croatian Alliance of Reti-
red and Senior Citizens) formed government in Varaždinska County. In 
Osječko-Baranjska County, independent list of Branimir Glavaš formed a 
post-electoral coalition with the HSP. In the 2007 national elections, the 
HDZ again formed a smaller coalition with the HSS, HSLS, SDSS and 
SDA. The 2009 local elections and electoral results were marked by pre- 
and post-electoral coalitions. The IDS formed a coalition with the HNS 
in Istarska County; the HDZ formed coalitions in 12 counties, usually 
with the HSS, HSLS, HSU, and/or HSP, and with independent lists in 
Splitsko-Dalmatinska and Šibensko-Kninska counties. The SDP formed 
government mostly with the HNS, HSU, and regional parties (PGS in 
Primorsko-Goranska County and ZDS in Krapinsko-Zagorska County) in 
eight counties. Finally, the 2013 local elections again show characteristics 
of barometer elections, quite similar to the 2001 elections, as the HDZ 
won the majority of votes in most counties. A further problem is that 
many parties that receive a relative majority of votes form ad hoc and vola-
tile post-electoral coalitions, sometimes even with parties on the opposite 
side of the ideological pole (e.g. HDZ and HNS in Međimurska County 
in 2005). There are numerous cases of pre- and post-electoral coalitions 
falling apart after the election, taking-up seats in county assemblies, and 
resulting in new party negotiations and coalitions or even in new electi-
ons.33
33  For example, after the 1997 county elections, the share of two party coalitions in 
the County Assembly in Primorsko-Goranska County was equal (HDZ/HSLS/HSS – 20; 
SDP/PGS/HNS – 20). The Assembly was dissolved because it did not manage to elect the 
county governor and the executive body. The early elections were held on 30 November 
1997 (Ivanišević et al., 2001: 195).
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The government congruence pattern explains to which extent a regional 
(county) voter responds to national or regional (county) government, i.e. 
the national government is compared to the regional (county) government. 
Government congruence is measured by using the dissimilarity index,34 
comparing the county political party (or coalition of parties) that has won 
the majority of county assembly seats to the national (or statewide) politi-
cal party (or coalition of parties) that has won the majority of seats in the 
national parliament in the previous national elections. This means taking 
the absolute difference per party, dividing it by two, and summing up the 
absolute differences. Scores obtained can range from complete congru-
ence or similarity (0%) to complete incongruence or dissimilarity (100%) 
(Schakel, 2011: 3). Government congruence is calculated depending on 
the following possibilities:
a)  If one party alone obtained the absolute majority (50 per cent 
+1) of seat share in the county assembly and also the absolute 
majority (50 per cent +1) of seat share in the national parliament 
in preceding national elections, absolute value of that party’s seat 
share (in per cent) obtained in county elections is subtracted by 
absolute value of the party’s seat share (in per cent) obtained by 
that party in the national parliament. The difference per party is 
then divided by two. In case that in the time of county elections 
the party is in opposition in the national parliament, the absolute 
value subtracted from the party’s county assembly seat share is 0 
(in %) and divided by two.
b)  If a pre-electoral party coalition obtained absolute majority (50 
per cent +1) of seats in the county assembly, first the share of 
each party to the coalition is calculated. For example, in the 2001 
county elections in the City of Zagreb county coalition of the 
SDP and HNS won the majority of seats in the county assembly 
(32 out of 51), with SDP bringing in 20 seats (62.5 per cent of 
32) and HNS bringing in 12 seats (37.5 per cent of 32). Then the 
seat share of each of that party in the national parliament is loo-
ked at. In the above example, at the time of county elections in 
2001, the SDP and HNS (together with four other parties) were 
34  The dissimilarity index, which compares vote shares of the same party participat-
ing in different elections, was developed by Jefferey and Hough, 2009; Johnston, 1980; Pal-
lares and Keating, 2003, in: Schakel, 2011: 3–4. The authors have applied the dissimilarity 
index to calculate the government congruence between elections for the county assembly 
and preceding elections for the national parliament, as suggested by Schakel and Dandoy.
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also forming a governing coalition in the national parliament, 
winning 46 out of total 151 seats. The SDP brought in 44 seats 
(47.31 per cent of the share in coalition) and the HNS brought 
in 2 seats (2.15 per cent of the share in coalition) taking the abso-
lute difference per party, dividing by two and summing the abso-
lute differences. Now, the share of SDP in the county assembly 
governing coalition (62.5 per cent) is subtracted from its share 
in the governing coalition in the national parliament (47.31 per 
cent) and divided by two (equalling 7.60 per cent). HNS’s share 
of 37.15 per cent in the county assembly governing coalition is 
subtracted by its 2.15 per cent share in the governing coalition in 
the national parliament and divided by two (equalling 17.68 per 
cent). The absolute differences are then added up for both parties 
(7.60 +17.68) and hence the government congruence between 
county and national government is 25.26 per cent. In case one 
or both parties were in opposition in the national parliament, the 
absolute value subtracted from the party’s county assembly seat 
share is zero (0) (in per cent), divided by two, and added up.
In Table 3, county elections held in 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 
2013 are compared to the preceding national elections both per county 
election and per county over time. Bolded figures represent the highest 
government congruence score (in Virovitičko-Podravska County in the 
1997 county elections (0.26 per cent), the lowest government congruen-
ce score (in Varaždinska County in the 1993 county elections 79.62 per 
cent), the highest to the lowest average government congruence score 
per county election (11.15 per cent in the 1997 county elections to 49.89 
per cent in the 2013 county elections) as well as  the highest and the 
lowest average government congruence score per county over time (17.61 
per cent in Požeško-Slavonska County and 44.17 per cent in Međimur-
ska County). However, none of the Croatian counties has ever reached 
the maximum value of dissimilarity or incongruence between county and 
national governments, while in very rare cases the dissimilarity index 
exceeds 50 per cent. In addition, as observed in Table 3, the variance in 
government congruence between counties over time shows a rather low 
dissimilarity index, which indicates a constant trend of nationalization of 
county elections, i.e. voters’ orientation towards statewide parties.
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Table 3: Congruence between county and national governments over time 
(in %)
Name of the county 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 Average per  county over time
Bjelovarsko- 
Bilogorska (BJB)
50.00 20.48 32.70 45.84 45.16 41.01 39.20
Brodsko-Posavska 
(BRP)
3.73 5.48 37.10 20.38 50.00 49.99
27.78
City of Zagreb (GZ) 4.13 5.53 25.26 42.36 48.24 45.55 28.51
Dubrovačko- 
Neretvanska (DUN)
2.05 4.60 40.86 49.99 26.59 47.74
28.64
Istarska (IST) 43.75 32.50 31.99 50.00 50.00 52.96 43.53
Karlovačka (KAR) 4.21 0.96 40.86 13.30 11.21 54.53 20.85
Koprivničko- 
Križevačka (KOK)




9.21 20.47 28.37 49.49 49.35 57.07
35.66
Ličko-Senjska (LIS) 12.96 8.25 40.87 9.93 15.30 50.00 22.89
Međimurska 
(MEĐ) 25.00 49.99 26.88 57.00 46.00 60.16 44.17
Osječko-Baranjska 
(OSB) 1.71 1.75 40.98 47.60 50.00 50.00 32.01
Požeško-Slavonska 
(POS) 2.13 2.18 31.81 14.65 9.87 45.00 17.61
Primorsko-Goranska 
(PRG) 27.50 52.17 34.66 45.16 49.50 23.14 38.69
Šibensko-Kninska 
(ŠIK) 5.22 1.73 26.82 11.17 13.10 50.00 18.01
Sisačko-Moslavačka 
(SIM) 5.91 0.26 49.99 40.60 48.00 75.22 36.66
Splitsko- 
Dalmatinska (SPD) 3.30 0.78 28.43 19.13 46.50 51.84 25.00
Varaždinska (VAR) 79.62 0.78 29.64 26.82 28.04 46.20 35.18
Virovitičko- 
Podravska (VIP) 4.92 0.26 40.78 39.47 40.50 50.03 29.33
Vukovarsko- 
Srijemska (VUS) 13.41 0.48 46.99 26.18 42.34 50.00 29.90
Zadarska (ZAD) 0.46 1.73 46.23 20.40 21.82 47.40 23.01
Zagrebačka (ZAG) 5.80 20.48 30.60 42.34 43.16 49.99 32.06
Average per county 
election 16.26 11.15 35.85 34.09 37.18 49.90 30.74
Source: Authors’ calculation
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4.2. Turnout Rates 
High average turnout rates may be observed in the 1990 national elec-
tions (84.5 per cent), in 1992 (75.60 per cent), in 1995 (68.80 per cent) 
and in the “critical” 2000 national elections (76.44 per cent). Average 
turnout rates for county elections were also rather high: 66 per cent in 
1993 and 71 per cent in the 1997 elections; but in the following elections, 
a steady decline in turnout is perceived (average 48 per cent turnout in 
2001; 42 per cent in 2005; 47 per cent in 2009 and 48 per cent in 2013). 
In the 2009 and 2013 elections for county governors (now the sole county 
executive body), turnout in the first round was in most cases identical to 
turnout for county assemblies. In the counties where two electoral rounds 
for the county governor had to take place, turnout in the second round 
was 5–20 per cent lower than in the first round in 2009, while in the 2013 
county elections turnout in the second round was 1–10 per cent lower 
than in the first round.
Table 4a: Highest and lowest turnout rates for county elections over time 
(in %)








































Table 4b: Highest and lowest turnout rates for national elections (in coun-
ties) over time (in %)
Elections 1992 1995
2000 2003 2007 2011
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For comparison, turnout in elections for the Croatian President has also 
been in systematic decline, with an exception of the 2000 presidential 
election, when the turnout rate was 67.5 per cent in the first round and 63 
per cent in the second round (Kasapović, 2011: 10).
Table 4c: Turnout rates in presidential elections over time (in %)
Election























Turnout 74.90 / 54.62 / 62.98 60.88 50.57 51.04 44 50.13
Source: Authors’ calculation
Electoral participation in Croatia has been in steady decline since 1990, 
with the exception of the 2000 national elections, which were marked by 
strong psychological and political mobilization of the Croatian voters re-
sulting in termination of the right-wing HDZ domination on the Croatian 
national and subnational political scene and victory of the left-wing coali-
tion (SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, IDS, and LS). The decline in participation 
in that period can be explained by structural factors, such as frequency of 
the elections, strong incumbent party and candidate, limited resources for 
electoral campaign, as well as by the empirically proven attitude of the vast 
majority of Croatian voters that their participation makes no difference as 
they have no influence on the national and local governments (Grdešić, 
1998: 18).35 More recently, institutional arrangements in which elections 
are conducted serve as an explanatory variable (Kasapović, 2011: 8). Po-
litical participation and transparency of the electoral procedure continued 
to decline in the 2000s due to the extended practice of forming pre-elec-
toral coalitions in the framework of the proportional electoral system. 
Voters abstain because of their dissatisfaction with the composition of 
the coalition, since pre- and post-electoral coalitions are formed following 
the “everybody-with-everybody” principle, which means that even large 
and ideologically opposite national parties sometimes make an alliance to 
win both national and subnational elections. An additional problem may 
arise in post-electoral government formation when weaker political par-
35  A survey conducted before the 1997 local elections on a random sample of 1,000 
voters in seven Croatian cities showed that only 55 per cent of them knew who the county 
governor was (Grdešić, 1998: 13).
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ties abandon their stronger coalition partners if they fail to occupy certain 
political positions in the county or to “push through” certain policy issues 
on the county assembly’s political agenda.
4.3. Electoral Supply
From 1990 to 2013, approximately 150 political parties, associations, and 
movements were founded in Croatia. Majority of them have participated 
in national and subnational elections for over two decades now. Approx-
imately a quarter never manage to reach the electoral threshold. There 
are fifty three parties competing in one county only. Thirty nine parties 
compete in several (two to five) counties, ten parties (DC; HDZ; HNS; 
HSLS; HSP; HSS; HKDU; HSU; SDP; LS) or compete or have compet-
ed in all counties. One party was competing at the national level only,36 
87 parties compete at the county and local levels, and 26 parties compete 
at all government levels.
Eighteen political parties in Croatia can be considered as parties with 
at least partially regional political agenda and thus conditionally referred 
to as regional parties. They are believed to represent specific interests of 
one or more neighbouring counties situated within the boundaries of the 
Croatian geographic and historic regions (Istria with Primorje, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia, Northwest Croatia, and Zagreb). However, they are not rooted 
in a particular ideological basis, as their political platform concerns repre-
senting “interests of a certain region reflecting all the heterogeneity of its 
population which means that they … have features of populist parties”. 
(Šiber, 1993: 126). Some of them are more or less successful in county 
elections (IDS, HDSSB, PGS, ZDS), while others have a marginal influ-
ence on voters’ preferences (AM, ARS, DA, IDF, MS, PS, SBHS, etc.). 
Seven regional parties participate in county and local elections in one 
county;37 five of them have participated in county and local elections in 
36  LIBRA, Party of Liberal Democrats, participated in the 2003 national elections 
and obtained three seats, but it merged with the HNS in 2005.
37   AM – Youth Action; ARS – Autonomous Regional Party of Croatian Primor-
je, Gorski kotar, Rijeka and the Islands, LRI – List for Rijeka participated in the Primor-
sko-Goranska County elections; MDS – Democratic Alliance of Međimurje and MS – Party 
of Međimurje competed in Međimurska County; PS – Party of Podravina competed in Ko-
privničko-Križevačka County; PSS – Posavsko-Slavonska Party competed in Vukovarsko-Sri-
jemska County.
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several (2-5) counties;38 and six of them have competed in both county 
and national elections.39
When looking at the political parties’ participation in the county executive 
body in a single county, in several counties, and in both the county execu-
tive body and the national government, the Primorsko-Goranska Alliance 
(PGS), Zagorje Democratic Party (ZDS), Croatian Pure Party of Rights 
(HČSP), Croatian Dalmatian Home (HDD), Posavsko-Slavonska Party 
(PSS), and the Autonomous Regional Party (ARS) were the parties that 
participated in a single county’s executive body. Five of them can be re-
ferred to as regional parties: the PGS and ARS in Primorsko-Goranska 
County, the HDD in Splitsko-Dalmatinska County, the PSS in Vukovar-
sko-Srijemska County, and the ZDS in Krapinsko-Zagorska County. The 
HČSP as a statewide party participated only in the executive body of 
Šibensko-Kninska County. Parties participating in several (two to five) 
county executive bodies were the IDS (Istarska and Primorsko-Gorans-
ka counties), HDSSB (Osječko-Baranjska and Požeško-Slavonska coun-
ties), SDSS (Sisačko-Moslavačka and Vukovarsko-Srijemska counties), 
and HKDU (Varaždinska, Sisačko-Moslavačka and Splitsko-Dalmatinska 
counties). Two of them are regional parties, the IDS and HDSSB, while 
one is an ethnic party (SDSS). The HKDU is a statewide party, although 
during 2000 it lost all of its influence. Finally, there are eleven political 
parties participating in both national governments and county executive 
bodies: HDZ, SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, LS,40 IDS, DC, SDSS, HSU, and 
SDA Croatia.41 
38  DPZS, Democratic Party of Prigorje and Zagreb competed in the City of Zagreb, 
Zagrebačka, and Karlovačka counties; DSSR, Democratic Party of Slavonian Plain compet-
ed in Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska, and Brodsko-Posavska counties; HDD, Cro-
atian Dalmatian Home, IDF, Istrian Democratic Forum competed in Primorsko-Goranska 
and Istarska counties; ZS, Party of Zagorje, competed in the City of Zagreb, Zagrebačka, 
and Krapinsko-Zagorska counties).
39  DA, Dalmatian Action competed in several counties of Dalmatia; HDSSB, Croa-
tian Democratic Party of Slavonia and Baranja competed in five counties of Slavonia; IDS, 
Istrian Democratic Assembly competed in Istarska and Primorsko-Goranska counties; PGS 
(ex RDS, Rijeka Democratic Alliance) competed in Primorsko-Goranska County, SBHS, 
Croatian Party of Slavonia and Baranja competed in three counties of Slavonia; and ZDS, 
Zagorje Democratic Party competed in the City of Zagreb and Krapinsko-Zagorska County.
40  It joined the HSLS in 2006.
41  SDA was founded in 1990 as a Bosniac party whose basic goal is to protect the na-
tional identity and political representation of the Bosniac community in all former Yugoslav 
countries. It has a Croatian branch called SDA Croatia.
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The Serbian minority is the largest national minority in Croatia with inter-
ests politically aggregated in parties competing in elections. The share of 
Serbian minority in the population is the highest in Vukovarsko-Srijemska 
County (15.5 per cent). Its presence in other counties is as follows: 11.7 
per cent in Sisačko-Moslavačka County, 11.5 per cent in Ličko-Senjska 
County, 11 per cent in Karlovačka County, 9.1 per cent in Šibensko-Knin-
ska County, 8.7 per cent in Osječko-Baranjska County, 7.1 per cent in 
Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska and in Virovitičko-Podravska Counties, and 6.5 
per cent in Požeško-Slavonska County (Koprić, 2007: 343). There are 
four ethnic parties representing Serbian national minority (SDSS, SNS, 
NSS, DPS). The SDSS as the strongest Serbian party competes at the 
national level and in ten counties where Serbian minority has a share in 
total population (those counties mostly overlap with counties affected by 
the war).42 Bosnian ethnic community is represented by the SDA, which 
competes at the local and county levels in Primorsko-Goranska, Šiben-
sko-Kninska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska and Zadarska counties, as well as at 
the national level.43
The most powerful statewide political parties are the Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ), the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), the Croatian 
Popular Party (HNS), the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), the Croatian 
Party of Rights (HSP), the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), and the 
Retired Citizens’ Party (HSU). Some of those parties have a large and 
dense hierarchical organizational system of their county and local branch-
es. The HDZ has 21 county branches, as well as the HNS. Moreover, the 
HNS has five regional alliances (Northwest Croatia, Slavonia and Baran-
ja, Central Croatia, Dalmatia, and one for Istra, Primorje, Gorski kotar, 
Lika, and Senj).44 The SDP has 16, HSS 20, and HSP 7 county branches. 
42  These are the following: Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska, Karlovačka, Ličko-Senjska Os-
ječko-Baranjska, Primorsko-Goranska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, Šibensko-Kninska, Viroviti čko- 
-Podravska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, and Zadarska counties. 
43  The political interests of the Roma ethnic community have been aggregated in two 
extremely marginal political parties, the SRH and HRDS. The SRH competed in Bjelovar-
sko-Bilogorska and Međimurska counties in the 1993 and 2005 elections. The HRDS was 
founded in 2007.
44  The statute of the HNS does not recognize the interconnection between regional 
identities and present administrative-territorial division (20 counties + the City of Zagreb). 
Rather, it envisages the tasks of the party’s regional alliances: “... acknowledging geographic, 
historical, cultural, and other particularities of the Croatian regions as units existing and rec-
ognized regardless of the present territorial-administrative organization of the Republic of 
Croatia, resp. administrative division into 20 counties and the City of Zagreb and taking into 
account the achieved level of institutionalization of its organization in Croatian regions, the 
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The branches usually have a rather differentiated internal structure usu-
ally consisting of the assembly, the executive body, the presidency, the 
secretary, the treasurer, and the court of honour. They also have coordina-
tion units and certain types of interest branches (e.g. youth club, women’s 
club, etc.). The tasks of county branches do not differ from party tasks 
at the state level, such as implementation of the partisan politics at the 
county level, information collection and reporting to the headquarters, in-
formation sharing, supervision of local (town and municipal) branches on 
the county territory, recruitment of new party members, mobilization of 
voters, etc. These tasks have a “nationalizing” effect on the local political 
system. Due to the similarity of local and national political systems, there 
is little chance for local policy, local parties, and local problems to influ-
ence voters’ preferences at the subnational level (cf. Kasapović, 2004: 91). 
The IDS as the most important regional party has a large organizational 
network consisting of nine branch associations of all over Istria and in part 
of Primorsko-Goranska County, with each community consisting of sev-
eral town and municipal branches. The HDSSB has spread its parliamen-
tary influence and has its branches in a large part of Slavonia and Baranja.
In the 2013 county elections, party coalitions won the majority of vote share 
in all counties. Two new regional parties participated in Dubrovačko-Ner-
etvanska County (MOST and DDS), each obtaining four seats in the 
county assembly.45 Two regionalist parties, the IDS (alone) and the 
HDSSB (in coalition with the Green Party) won the majority of votes 
in the assemblies of Istarska and Osječko-Baranjska County respectively. 
Nine regional parties obtained vote share in county elections in 11 coun-
ties, out of which six regional parties in electoral alliance with statewide 
HNS establishes its regional organization so that it connects partisan county organizations 
in a particular region, i.e. that it allies close regions or subregions into one regional alliance 
of HNS ... specific function of a regional alliance is harmonization of county organizations’ 
viewpoints in a particular region on the issues interfering specific economic, social, cultural 
and other interests of regions, as well  as representation of regional viewpoints in the central 
bodies of HNS …”
45  Although the statue of MOST mentions decentralisation of state functions to the 
units of local and regional self-government, neither of those two parties have promotion of 
specific regional interests as a separate goal in their statutes. The statute of MOST: http://
most-nl.com/o-mostu/nas-statut/; the statute of DDS: http://dubrovackidemokratskisabor.
hr/images/Statut_stranke.pdf. DDS mentions in its general provisions “... safeguarding and 
promoting particularities and values of political, economic, and cultural heritage and tradi-
tion of the Republic of Croatia and broader Dubrovnik region ...” but later states that ”... 
the broader Dubrovnik region … in the time of enacting this Statute ‘covers’ the area of 
Dubrovačko-Neretvanska County”.
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parties (in nine thereof one regional party was in coalition, in two counties 
more than one regional party was in coalition). The majority of county 
assembly seats in eight counties were obtained by regional parties. No 
regional party out of electoral alliance obtained the absolute majority of 
votes, except the IDS in Istarska County. Statewide government parties 
won a relative majority of vote share in electoral alliance in five counties, 
and absolute majority of vote share in a coalition in one county. Statewide 
opposition parties won a relative majority of votes in coalition in ten co-
unties, and absolute majority of votes in three counties, which proves the 
second-order election effects in county elections as a trend.
5. Conclusion 
Hesitating attempts of political regionalization in conjunction with weak 
fiscal capacities provoke counties’ political and economic dependence on 
the central state, which in turn has a decisive influence on voters’ political 
behaviour at the county level – they might turn to statewide parties just 
as counties depend on and turn to the state. Where this is not the case, 
namely where historic, social, economic, and cultural environment allows 
for the development of distinctive regional identities and interests, pow-
erful regional political sentiments arise. Istarska County and the IDS are 
the best example. However, the majority of county political scene is still 
strongly dominated by national actors, political parties, and processes.46 
When talking about county and local political parties, this mostly refers 
to county and local organizational branches of the most powerful nation-
al parties that are considered as “regional” because they have an “elec-
toral stronghold” in the counties where they were founded (Kasapović, 
2004: 85). Ličko-Senjska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Splitsko-Dalmatinska, 
Brodsko-Posavska, Zadarska, Karlovačka, and to some extent Šiben-
sko-Kninska, Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska Virovitičko-Podravs-
ka and Karlovačka counties are electoral strongholds of the HDZ. Regard-
ing the SDP, this is mostly the case in Primorsko-Goranska County and in 
the City of Zagreb while and the HNS is strong in Međimurska County. 
“True” regional parties, the IDS and HDSSB, continuously obtain seats in 
46  This can also be concluded by looking at the names of the political parties that 
form both national and subnational government, as they have the adjective ‘Croatian’ in 
their name, with the exception of the SDP and IDS, both of which are currently in the gov-
erning parliament coalition of left-wing parties (SDP, HNS, IDS, and HSU). 
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their respective counties. The IDS formed the majority in Istarska County 
Assembly in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2013 alone, in 2005 in coalition with 
the left-wing SDP, and in 2009 in coalition with the left-wing HNS. The 
IDS (also in coalition with the SDP and some regional parties) won coun-
ty elections in Primorsko-Goranska County. Since 2009, the HDSSB has 
obtained assembly seats in five Slavonian counties (Brodsko-Posavska, 
Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska; Virovitičko-Podravska, and Vuk-
ovarsko-Srijemska) and it had the majority in Osječko-Baranjska County 
Assembly in 2009 and 2013, both times in coalition with the Green Party. 
In 2009, the HDSSB’s candidate won the county governor election.
Since 2001, an ongoing but hesitant process of decentralization and pro-
liferation of new, small parties can be noticed. However, they achieve 
rather poor, almost insignificant results in regional elections. On the other 
hand, independent lists are progressively on the rise regarding their num-
ber and success since the 2001 subnational elections. They gain about 20 
per cent of votes, but only 10 per cent of seats. The same figure is true for 
independent candidates for executive functions in the 2009 subnational 
elections. In the 2013 county elections, 20 independent lists competed 
for the county assembly, 8 of them obtained above 5 per cent of votes 
(11.24 per cent of vote share on average). Nine independent candidates 
competed for the position of county governor, one of them won (City 
of Zagreb) and one of them entered the second election round, but lost 
them (Splitsko-Dalmatinska County).
Second-order election (or rather, third-order election) effects are rather 
strong in Croatian counties. National political parties dominate the re-
gional political scene, depriving regional politics from independent devel-
opment adjusted to the specific regional context and resulting in voters’ 
orientation towards statewide parties and formation of electoral coalitions 
modelled after national patterns. Nevertheless, there are arguments that 
the Croatian subnational electoral system has some elements that may be 
pointing at a certain regional logic. Turnout is lower than in national elec-
tions (which is a standard element of second-order election effects) but 
electoral results show rise of votes cast for independent lists and decline 
of votes cast for national parties (both government and opposition). What 
could change the nature of regional elections is the transformation of sub-
national electoral system towards more local problem-oriented approach 
and preferential voting for the candidates. Institutional mechanisms 
should enable more personalized elections: majority system, preferential 
lists, and/or better promotion of independent candidates (Omejec, 2002: 
150–151; Kasapović, 2004: 92).
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In addition, the processes of territorial reorganization and further decen-
tralization could contribute to representativeness and legitimacy of the 
regional electoral system. Current electoral units in Croatia should follow 
natural and historical regional framework. This could be possible if the 
current illogical structure of 21 counties (more in: Koprić, 2001) were 
transformed into five regions that could also serve as electoral units for 
national elections.47 In this way, regional dimension in electoral competi-
tion and political representation could be strengthened (Kasapović, 2011: 
28). Although society is politically, economically, culturally, regionally, 
religiously, and ethnically heterogeneous, the Croatian governance sys-
tem is still highly centralized (Koprić, 2010: 137; Kasapović, 2011: 26). 
It is obvious that the more regionalized and decentralized the state, the 
more importance and independence will be gained by regional commu-
nities, regional political actors, and elections. This will probably have a 
positive feedback on political culture of the regional electorate. However, 
the desired changes are still under consideration as the political and so-
cial consent for transformation of the current stabilized, but dysfunctional 
electoral and territorial system has still not been given.
At the moment, a new regional concept with five historical regions is un-
dergoing a serious professional and political debate. If Croatia had five 
regions with significant financial capacity and autonomy for performing 
a wide scope of public affairs, including regional economic and social de-
velopment, the importance of regional elections would certainly be in-
creased, maybe even to the level of national elections. 
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COUNTY ELECTIONS IN CROATIA:  
ON THE PATH TO GENUINE REGIONAL POLITICS
Summary
Current second-tier organization in Croatia is based on twenty counties and 
the City of Zagreb with the county status. The counties are relatively small and 
have a rather low financial capacity and developmental role. In the period 
1993–2001, counties were predominantly units responsible for deconcentrated 
state administration, with rather narrow autonomy. That is why county electi-
ons were of third order, after national and local elections. After 2001, counti-
es were rearranged as autonomous units without any state administrative tasks 
and with a widened self-government scope. County elections became second-or-
der, subordinated to national elections, which is demonstrated in this analysis. 
Relatively low government congruence score between county and national go-
vernments over time confirms that government parties lose votes in county elec-
tions and opposition parties gain votes. The turnout rate shows that voters cast 
ballots in county elections more rarely than in national elections. The counties 
political arena is still dominated by national parties and their organizational 
branches. County elections are highly ‘nationalized’ since they reflect national 
political institutions, processes, and patterns of political behaviour. At the mo-
ment, a new regional concept with only five historical regions is under serious 
professional and political debate. In the near future, the introduction of new, 
genuine regional organization instead of present counties is likely. If those five 
new regions with broad autonomous scope of affairs are established, including 
regional development and strong regional policy, regional elections may become 
less subordinated to national elections and more oriented to specific interest of 
particular regions. The importance of regional elections depends mainly on the 
significance of the regional scope of public affairs and the financial capacity of 
regional units. 
Key words: counties, Croatia, electoral system, national elections, county elec-
tions, county assembly, regional political parties, regional politics
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ŽUPANIJSKI IZBORI U HRVATSKOJ:  
NA PUTU PREMA STVARNOJ REGIONALNOJ POLITICI
Sažetak
Sadašnja organizacija druge razine lokalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj temelji se 
na dvadeset županija i Gradu Zagrebu, koji ima ovlasti grada i županije. Žu-
panije se relativno male i imaju slabe financijske kapacitete i nedovoljnu razvoj-
nu ulogu. U razdoblju 1993.–2001. županije su prije svega bile odgovorne za 
obavljanje poslova dekoncentrirane državne uprave s vrlo uskom autonomijom. 
Zato su županijski izbori bili po važnosti izbori trećega reda, iza parlamentar-
nih i lokalnih izbora. Nakon 2001. županije su reorganizirane kao autonomne 
jedinice koje više ne obavljaju poslove državne uprave, a samoupravni djelokrug 
im je proširen. Županijski izbori postali su izbori drugog reda, kako se vidi iz 
analize. Relativno niski indeks podudaranja županijskih i nacionalne vlasti u 
vremenskoj perspektivi potvrđuje da vladine stranke gube glasove u županijskim 
izborima, dok oporbene stranke glasove dobivaju. Stopa izlaznosti pokazuje da 
glasači rjeđe izlaze na županijske nego na nacionalne izbore. Županijska poli-
tička arena je još uvijek u rukama nacionalnih političkih stranaka i njihovih žu-
panijskih ogranaka. Županijski su izbori visoko nacionalizirani jer odražavaju 
nacionalne političke institucije, procese i načine političkog ponašanja. Trenutno 
se vode ozbiljne stručne i političke rasprave o novom regionalnom konceptu s pet 
povijesnih regija. Postoji vjerojatnost uvođenja istinske regionalne organizacije 
u budućnosti, umjesto postojeće županijske organizacije. Ako bi se uspostavilo 
pet regija sa širokim samoupravnim djelokrugom, uključujući regionalni razvoj 
i snažne regionalne politike, regionalni bi izbori mogli postati manje podređeni 
nacionalnima i više orijentirani na posebne interese pojedinih regija. Značenje 
regionalnih izbora uglavnom ovisi o važnosti kruga regionalnih poslova i finan-
cijskom kapacitetu regionalnih jedinica. 
Ključne riječi: županije, Hrvatska, izborni sustav, nacionalni izbori, županij-
ski izbori, županijska skupština, regionalne političke stranke, regionalna poli-
tika
